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Abstract: 
Prior relations between the acquiring firm and the target company pave the way for 
knowledge transfers subsequent to the acquisitions. One major reason is that through the 
market-based relations the two actors build up mutual trust and simultaneously they learn 
how to communicate. An empirical study of 54 Danish acquisitions taking place abroad 
from 1994 to 1998 demonstrated that when there was a high level of trust between the 
acquiring firm and the target firm before the take-over, then medium and strong tie-binding 
knowledge transfer mechanisms, such as project groups and job rotation, were used more 
intensively. Further, the degree of stickiness was significantly lower in the case of prior 
trust-based relations.  
 
1. Introduction 
A successful integration of an acquired firm into a multinational corporation depends on an 
effective communication between the two formerly independent units. Therefore the two 
firms, now headquarters and a subsidiary, need to build up routines regarding how to 
communicate. Several knowledge transfer mechanisms going from computerized 
communication techniques to pure dyadic face-to-face contacts between individuals can be 
used for this purpose. However, communication is never easy and knowledge transfers 
across firm boundaries are often a complex matter. It is often pointed out that a high degree 
of stickiness exists when transferring knowledge between organisational units, and 
especially in transfers consisting of elements of tacit knowledge.  
 
Specific transfer mechanisms are therefore needed to secure transfers of knowledge with a 
high degree of criticalness. Such transfers carry elements of value-creating resources and 
include capabilities and competences and are therefore critical for non-owners to receive. 
However, such transfers will not occur without a considerable level of trust between the 
dispatcher and receiver of knowledge. The reason is that competence transfers make the 
dispatcher vulnerable to imitation. Without trust a high degree of stickiness in the transfers 
is therefore foreseen.  
 
The integration of acquired units can be interpreted as a learning process in how to transfer 
knowledge, but simultaneously it can be seen as a trust-building process where both 
elements minimize stickiness. However, if relations between the two actors are established 
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before the take-over, for example, through a strategic alliance or through a dyadic market 
relationship, the two organisations have already established cross-border communication 
patterns through an adaptation process. Further, the atmosphere of trustworthiness makes 
the transfer of critical knowledge more likely to take place subsequent to the acquisition.   
 
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that previous trust-based relations between the 
acquirer and the target smoothens the subsequent integration process and make the use of 
corporate knowledge transfers more likely. Here trust paves the way for using strong tie-
binding transfer mechanisms such as job-rotation. The use of strong tie-binding transfer 
mechanisms is less likely in take-overs without any prior relations. The second hypothesis 
tested is that prior trust-based relations also cause less degree of stickiness in knowledge 
transfers, again in a comparison to the situation of low or non-trust-based prior relations 
between the acquirer and the target.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to put a focus on how previous trust-based relations between an 
acquirer and a target influence the use of knowledge transfer mechanism between 
headquarters and the new subsidiary. In Section Two different aspects of trust and prior 
relations between acquirer and the target will be discussed. In the following Section the 
three different transfer mechanism - workshops, project groups and job-rotation - will be 
outlined and the relation to weak tie-binding versus strong tie-binding mechanisms will be 
established. In section Four a model by Szulanski (2000) describing different stages of 
stickiness is discussed in more detail. A model describing the relationships of trust, transfer 
mechanism and stickiness is presented in Section Five. The data collecting methods, here a 
questionnaire study, are shortly discussed in Section Six and some basic characteristics of 
the sample of 54 Danish firms acquiring abroad in the period 1994-1998 are outlined in 
Section Seven. The statistical results, based on a t-test of two groups of pre-levels of trust, 
are presented in Section Eight and finally concluding remarks are to be found in Section 
Nine. 
 
2. The Importance of Trust-based Relations 
Antecedent relations between the market participants build up reciprocal trustworthiness 
and together with mutual adaptations in the two organisations establish a solid basis for 
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efficient communication patterns subsequent to the acquisition. The relationship between 
the two market participants develops over time (Andersson, Johanson & Vahlne, 1997), 
and the firms adapt their respective organisations to make transfers of resources and 
communication patterns well functioning. This adaptation process reflects a unilateral or 
mutual adjustment of attitudes, strategy, knowledge, and ways of knowledge-transfers in 
the network manifested in modified products and processes (Forsgren et al, 1995).  The 
adaptation process taking place between the two firms is therefore an essential component 
in the increasing involvement of a dyadic relationship that modifies organizations and 
smoothens the subsequent integration after the take-over, because similarities in 
organisational structures make it easier to assimilate inflowing knowledge from another 
corporate unit (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
 
To gain access to knowledge embedded in a unit placed outside the boundaries of a firm 
presuppose absorptive and adaptive capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Often a firm’s 
absorptive capacity is an outcome of a personal dyadic relationship where individuals, 
playing the role of gatekeepers stand in the interface of the firm and its external partners 
(Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). To give some examples, transfers 
of information take place through managerial relationships or between engineers in the two 
companies. These relationships can be formal as well as informal. A successful adaptation 
process is based on specific employers skills of making transfers (Stuart, 1998). Such skills 
take time to develop, and successful adaptation processes then depend on a long-lasting 
relationship between the two firms. Here adaptations reflect a continuously learning 
process, where repeated business exchanges give insight to the partner’s needs and 
capabilities. This learning process reduces cost and increases synergy effects (Anderson, 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1997). Subsequent to the take-over there will be individuals in both 
organizations who know how to communicate and further translate and dispatch 
information to other employees in their respective organisations. 
 
The knowledge transfers between independent actors depend on the level of trust between 
the dispatcher and receiver of knowledge. A common statement is that knowledge transfers 
through the market create transaction cost (Williamson, 1975). One example is 
opportunistic behaviour that forces the partners to regulate their behaviours through the use 
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of contracts (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Hart, 1995). By taking a network approach the 
aspect of opportunism is replaced by a trust-based relationship instead (Forsgren et al, 
1995). In a trust-based relationship the actors are ready to be vulnerable, because 
delivering critical information opens the door of imitation of products and competences 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). Trust is affected by the transaction involved, and the predictability of different 
outcomes reflects the risk involved in the exchange. Trust is the willingness to take that 
risk as in, for example, exchange of critical knowledge. The degree of trust therefore 
depends of the criticalness of exchanged resources (Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pilutla, 
1998). However, actors are ready to be vulnerable since information has its highest value 
when it comes from trusted informants (Granovetter, 1985). 
 
Trust relates to the adaptation process. Between the partners, general standard principles 
are established that both partners finds acceptable (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; 
Bidault & Jarillo, 1997; Jones & George, 1998). The outcome of the relationships alters the 
level of trust in an ongoing process and increases in trust makes the information transferred 
more accurate, relevant and complete. Over time the relationships attain stability. The 
participants accept more interdependency, have fewer control procedures, and gain greater 
confidence and greater commitment to do what they agreed to (Zand, 1972). This can be 
seen as a strong form of trust relationship where trust emerges independent of economic 
and social governance mechanisms, since opportunistic behaviour violates central values, 
principles and standards of behaviour of both partners (Barney & Hansen, 1994).  
 
If trust is established prior to the take-over the two actors can continue to exchange critical 
information immediately subsequent to the acquisition. The respective actors know that the 
other partner can be trusted and this pave the way of an intensive use of corporate 
knowledge transfer mechanisms. 
 
3. Multinational Knowledge Transfer Mechanism 
One may claim that a main point in the strategy of multinational corporations is the 
problem of integrating fragmented knowledge into the corporation. The multiplication of 
the international mergers and acquisitions increases fragmentation and new ways of 
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integration and interaction are needed, like internal circulation of knowledge between 
localized units (Cohendet et al, 1999). Acquired firms no longer remain autonomous, but 
become important parts of heterarchies (Hedlund, 1986) or differentiated networks (Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1997; see also Birkinshaw 2000). Firms are acquired because they possess 
substantial elements of competence (Chakrabarti, Hauschildt & Süverkrüp, 1994) and 
integration and establishing of efficient knowledge transfer mechanisms are essential for 
the utilisation of the acquired resources. 
 
Knowledge transfers take place in a combination of language, observation, imitation and 
practice, and therefore individual commitment is localized and geographically defined. It 
also involves individual interactions with an emotional dimension. The use of extensive 
travel and transfer of managers, R&D personnel and so forth between organizational units, 
and joint work teams and committees supports the integration of the acquired firm 
(Cohendet et al, 1999).  
  
One aspect is the choice of transfer mechanism. Three different instruments will be 
discussed here: workshops, project-groups and job-rotation1. The three factors can be 
graduated according to the strength of ties between sub-units and persons they bring about. 
Weak ties between units can help to search or scan for information, but strong ties are 
needed for transferring complex knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Nooteboom, 1999). Weak ties 
increase the quantitative diffusion of knowledge simply by the numbers of actors that can 
be retold a piece of information (Granovetter, 1972), whereas hard-to-imitate resources 
need qualitative diffusion by establishment of tightly coupled relationships (Steensma & 
Carley, 2000). Interpersonal communication is therefore often the way by which 
engineering personnel acquire and disseminate important ideas and information (Katz & 
Tushman, 1983). The reason is that a communication channel is more reliable when 
building on frequently personal contacts (Arrow, 1969) and, as stated before, critical 
knowledge transfers are an outcome of sustained and repeated exchanges that build up trust 
between the dispatcher and receiver of knowledge. An acquired firm for that reason needs 
to be coupled to other corporate sub-units by corporate knowledge transfer mechanism to 
                                                                          
1The chosen mechanisms are all based on personal face to fact contact. Increasing in importance is the use of computerized 
communication techniques such as the intra-net (De Meyer, 1991; Håkanson, 1995; Gammelgaard, 2000). However this aspect will not 
be discussed here. 
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established both loose connections used for information scanning and tight relations used 
for transfers of critical knowledge (Hansen, 1999).  
 
Participating in workshops and scientific conferences often represents an opportunity to 
form new network ties, because these often demand less structured frames for interactions 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Additional, the maintenance of weak ties might be the most important 
consequence of a workshop (Granovetter, 1972). At the personal level, conferences are a 
forum for information scanning and ideal to establish loose contacts, so employees 
afterwards basically know whom to contact in the corporation to acquire specific 
knowledge (Nooteboom, 1999). 
 
In the case of acquisitions the use of workshops is an efficient integration instrument 
because initially acculturation and effective personal integration requires some form of 
face-to-face interaction. Seminars, workshops and conferences are instruments that 
promote the establishment of informal contacts to a broad band of employees from other 
units, contrary to participating in project groups that provide intensive and formal network 
relations to a few particular people in the organization (Håkanson, 1995).  
 
Project groups are stronger in their structure. This transfer mechanism is often used to 
solve specific problems, or to build up a particular capability in co-operation between 
different corporate units. However, this structure is a kind of hybrid, because it never 
reaches full frequency like in job-rotation, but at the same time it does not involve the 
same degree of looseness as a conference. Therefore despite the fact that the set up of 
project groups consisting members from different sub-units will improve communication, 
The degree of knowledge transfers will always be lower between members rooted in 
different cultures and corporate allegiances than between members who daily work 
together (Hennart, 1982). 
 
Following the line of reasoning for building strong ties, the most effective way to integrate 
and establishing tight personal relationship in a MNC must be through job-rotation. 
Though, in general, the use of job rotation both causes weak and strong ties, because the 
establishment of new networks for the expatriate also establish links between the new 
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network and his existing networks. This mobility bridge weak tie between more coherent 
clusters giving an easier flow activated at meetings (Granovetter, 1972). Job-rotation also 
include employment in new functions and creates diversity of background for employees, 
e.g., giving R&D engineers knowledge of manufacturing operations, or foreign researches 
practices or create relations to foreign sources of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Grant, 1996). Further, in the case of acquisition of non-internationalised local-oriented 
firms expatriates are used as a vehicle for increasing the subsidiaries’ international 
knowledge bases. The employees learn how to operate in an international environment 
(Downes & Thomas, 2000). A survey by Capron & Mitchell, (1998) show that acquiring 
firms rotate people from the acquired unit in order to teach them the existing corporate 
managerial system.  
 
The focus in this paper is the strengthening of employees’ cultural knowledge, and 
especially in the case of an acquisition, where job-rotation can be seen as a way to transfer 
external knowledge, specifically the knowledge from an acquired firm, across the borders 
of a multinational corporation (Foss & Pedersen, 2000). An embedded capability or skill of 
a scientific employee that is hard to imitate or articulate could be assimilated through a 
long stay in a foreign unit where daily interaction slowly but safely secures knowledge 
transfers to other employees.  
 
Especially in the case of acquisitions it is possible to transfer people to different corporate 
units, a possibility that rarely exists in, for example, strategic alliances. The alternative is to 
hire the skilled person, but that person then will loose his connection to his original firm, 
thereby eroding the value of embedded knowledge between that person and his 
organisation. Moreover the person could be resistant to leave his firm permanently. In this 
connection, the expatriate in a multinational corporation has the opportunity to go back to 
his original position, a situation that does not exist if the person concerned is hired through 
the market. 
 
Finally, acquired firms are likely to take an initially autonomous position in the acquiring 
corporation because of its former independence. Coming from an autonomous subsidiary 
might give some personal and cultural problems to the expatriate. Rotation is therefore 
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difficult to implement without the use of incentive instruments (Håkanson, 1995).  On the 
other hand, prior relations reduce the degree of autonomy and the acquiring unit will be 
less unfamiliar to the expatriate. A positive relation between prior relations and the use of 
job-rotation is therefore to be foreseen. 
 
4. Stickiness 
One major problem when utilising and diffusing the acquired resources in the acquiring 
corporation is stickiness in knowledge transfers. However, the level of analysis most often 
used in the literature is the problem of transferring knowledge per se, and some kind of 
structure is therefore sensible in this discussion. The discussion here will build on the work 
of Szulanski (2000) who operates with four stages of knowledge transfers, each of them 
represented by different kind of stickiness. Initiation stickiness is the difficulties in 
recognizing opportunities for transfers. One example is the existence of a competence in a 
subsidiary not recognized by the headquarters or other affiliates in the corporation. 
Implementation stickiness relates to the more technical problems of knowledge transfers, 
where disparities in language, coding schemes and cultural behaviour create barriers. 
Ramp-up stickiness relates to the period after the transfer, where unexpected problems 
raise when introducing the knowledge. The new environment may react differently than 
expected, training of people is inefficient, staff leave the organization, or new standards 
change the organizational culture in the wrong direction. In the last phase integration 
stickiness causes problems in exploiting and routinizing the accepted knowledge. 
Difficulties may occur and the organization returns to the original setting. 
 
Initiation stickiness relates to political and sociological explanations. One example is 
headquarters that consistently consider the information from a subsidiary of no relevance 
(Huber, 1991). Reasons for this non-recognition situation in multinational corporations are 
often a question of cultural and geographical distance (Huseman & Goodman, 1999) or the 
size of the multinational corporation, where the recognition process becomes very complex 
(Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). Another aspect is the “Not Invented Here” syndrome that often 
makes decision-makers blind to alternatives (Forsgren, 1997). Resistance arises from 
ethnocentric behaviour where corporate managers believe in a superior national identity 
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and are suspicious of the unknown. In addition, new initiatives also threaten their current 
status in the organisation (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999).  
 
The organisational power relations often influence the incentives to make transfers. One 
initial aspect is hierarchical rigidities in the form of bureaucratic structures (Huseman & 
Goodman, 1999), but more important is the struggle for power in a corporation (Forsgren 
& Johanson, 1992), where the sub-units keep back critical knowledge to protect their own 
competences (Huber, 1991; Szulanski, 1995; Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999; Hansen, 
1999), and transfers are then impeded because of goal congruence between the units 
(Forsgren, Johanson & Sharma, 2000). At the personal level, to protect their careers, 
scientists or researchers often block flows of communication because of the competitive 
pressure they experience (Collins, 1975). Prior relations between the firms, and between 
their respective employees may lower stickiness because often the valuable resources are 
recognized. Further, trust might solve some of the political problems that will occur in the 
integration process. However, by entering a new organisation system, the acquired firm 
still has to struggle for its position and protect its competences. 
 
The technical problems of transferring knowledge are many, but in general these can be 
minimized over time by frequent use of knowledge transfer mechanisms (Huber, 1991; 
Forsgren, 1997). Here previous relationships are essential in the learning how to make 
transfers. Stickiness in knowledge transfers to and from the acquired units also decreases 
over time if such a unit is integrated as a result of the adaptation process. 
 
The ramp-up stickiness is often a result of low motivation or ability to adopt the transferred 
knowledge (Szulanski, 1995). The employees of the acquired firm sometimes look at the 
acquiring firm as a threat of their existence and will therefore be in opposition. The build 
up of trust is therefore a foundation for a freely exchange of knowledge (Jones & George, 
1998; Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999). Again, if the knowledge source is not reliable or 
trustworthy, receiver units will be more resistant (Szulanski, 1995) even if headquarters 
dictates implementation of transferred knowledge. Again prior relations, and a high degree 
of trustworthiness subsequently will lower stickiness, mainly because receivers to a high 
degree acknowledge the transferred information. 
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 5. The Model 
The purpose of the model is to illustrate the relation between a prior level of trust between 
the acquisition actors and the subsequent use of knowledge transfer mechanism. Further 
the relation between prior trust and the degree of stickiness in subsequent knowledge 
transfers is established. Figure one shows the relatedness 
 
Figure 1: The relation between prior trust and subsequent knowledge transfers 
 
Transfer mechanism Strong tie > medium 
and low tie 
mechanisms 
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   - 
Trust 
 Stickiness 
  
 
 
In general, prior trust-based relations will lead to a more intensive use of knowledge 
transfer mechanisms because actors to a higher degree are willing to be vulnerable and 
therefore deliver information to other corporate units. The prior relations between the 
actors also influence the absorptive capacity, which make transfers easier. Prior trust-based 
relations favour strong tie-binding mechanisms like job-rotation. The organisations are to a 
higher degree adapted to absorb complex knowledge. Further, expatriates will feel lower 
uncertainty about the acquiring firm. The use of a strong tie transfer mechanism reflects a 
high degree of integration between the two units. One the other hand a weak tie transfer 
mechanism is useful to spread out information to a high number of receivers 
simultaneously. Project groups are efficient in specific problem solving and in innovative 
processes such as development of new products or processes. Strong tie-binding 
mechanisms like workshops are likely to be used in the integration phase, and especially 
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when the acquiring firm has no detailed information about the acquired units resources.  
The formation of project groups and the set up of workshops can take place during a 
market-based relationship and especially in the case of strategic alliances. Weak tie-
binding is then already established when the acquisition is based on a prior relationship. 
The model therefore illustrates that weak and medium tie-binding mechanisms are 
commonly used subsequent to a take-over, but the use of strong tie-binding transfer 
mechanism depends on at least an acceptable level of trust between the partners, 
established through a prior relationship. This gives the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The use of jobrotation subsequent to an acquisition is higher in the situation of 
medium or high prior levels of trust between the acquirer and the target compared to a low 
or non trust situation. 
 
The degree of stickiness will also be lower in the case of a prior trust relation. A higher 
degree of recognition initially is likely because of the already established exchanges of 
resources and information, because of minimized cultural distances. The solving of 
technical problems in transfers is likely to occur over time. High levels of trust also 
influences the ramp up stickiness and as an example core employees would be motivated to 
stay in the acquired firm. The discussion here leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Stickiness in knowledge transfers subsequent to the acquisitions is lower in the 
situation of medium or high prior levels of trust between the acquirer and the target 
compared to a low or non-trust situation 
 
6. Data Collection and the Sample 
A questionnaire was sent by post in the spring of year 2000 to the CEOs of 151 Danish 
firms acquiring abroad in the period 1994 – 1998.  Three send-outs by post and a follow-up 
phone call to non-responding firms resulted in 54 returned questionnaires. The response 
rate was 35,76%. The response rate is acceptable, compared to other surveys in general, 
though the absolute number of responses is low. 
 
A bias control of the responding firms compared to non-responding firms includes figures 
of numbers of acquisitions in the survey period, investment countries, headquarters 
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establishing year, corporate numbers of employees from 1993 and 1998 and corporate 
turnover, 1993 and 1998. The result of this test shows no bias of significance.  
 
7. The Sample 
The acquiring Danish firms are typically medium-sized with less than 1.000 employees, 
although a few firms are very large and internationalised, which gives a mean of 
employees of respectively 1182 and 3.95 numbers of employees in Denmark and abroad. 
The typical firm acquires less than one firm per year in the period but again some firms 
acquire more frequently. At the top of this scale one firm acquired 74 foreign firms in 18 
different countries. The targets are often small firms, and the median is 170 employees and 
a turnover at the time of take-over was in average US$ 17,50 Million. In 41 of the 54 cases 
there was some kind of prior relationship. 27 firms indicated a competitor relationship, six 
firms acquired a former alliance/joint venture partner, five of the relations were to a former 
supplier, and two firms acquired a customer2. A total of 32 firms noted the number of years 
of the relationship. The mean is 5,71 years with a median at 5 years. This figure indicates a 
medium relation period before the take-over. A total of 17 firms indicated less than 5 
years, 8 firms was represented in the range of 6-10 years, and finally 5 firms had more than 
10 years of relations. The maximum period was 20 years, and the standard deviation was 
less than 6 years. Most of the firms had rather frequent contact to the coming target. In 
terms of contact 28 firms responded to that question and 11 of them indicated a weekly 
contact with the target firm. 10 indicating a monthly contact and only 7 noting yearly 
contact with the target firm.  
 
8. Statistical Results 
For testing the effect of prior trust on the use of knowledge transfer mechanism and 
stickiness the cohort was divided into two groups: one with medium or high levels of trust 
between the two firms and another group with no prior relations or where the relations only 
resulted in a low degree of trust. For that purpose a 1-7 point Likert scale was used, where 
“1” indicated a poor level of trust and “7” showed a high level of trust. 30 firms responded 
with 3 or more to the question and were categorized in the group of medium or high level 
of trust. In 24 of the cases there were not any relations or the responder indicated a “1 or 
                                                                          
2 One firm did not specified the relationship, but later in the questionnaire they indicated the relationship 
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2”. The four transfer factors were likewise based on a 1-7 point Likert Scale. The first 
question asked about the degree to which the acquired firm participated in workshops and 
conferences internally in the corporation. The second question reflected the degree to 
which the acquired firm employees participated in project groups with employees from 
other parts of the corporation. The third question involves the element of job-rotating 
employees to other corporate units or employees from other units that were expatriated to 
the acquired firm. The final question was phrased as to whether in general it causes 
problems to transfer knowledge of technology and competences from the acquired firm to 
other units in the multinational corporation. This kind of knowledge was chosen because it 
is likely to comprise the highest degree of tacitness (Polanyi, 1958, Nelson & Winther, 
1982; Winter, 1987; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  
 
The use of a 1-7 point Likert scale makes it possible to compare the means of the two 
groups. By using a T-test takes the variances within the group into account and points out 
the degree of significance between the means. The T-test is often used in clustering 
analysis, where means in different variables are used to, for example, establish roles of 
foreign subsidiaries (Jarillo & Martinez, 1990). One tailed analysis is used since the 
comparison between two groups will always turn out to be either negative or positive in 
regard to which order the two groups are compared.  
 
The results of the t-test are presented in table 1. Here it is shown that hypothesis 1, saying 
that job-rotation is more often used in those acquisitions were prior medium or high trust-
based relations can be observed, is supported at a 5% significance level. The supposition of 
equality between the two groups in the use of workshops and project groups is supported in 
the use of workshops, but the formation of project groups is significantly higher at a 10 % 
level. However, there is a strong tendency towards are more frequent use of workshops too 
in the high or medium trust group, indicated by a p-value of 0,18. 
 
Taking a look at the absolute figures changes the picture. The use of jobrotation is still 
significantly higher in the high trust group but in general the use of this transfer 
mechanism is very low in both groups. Therefore the use of job rotation is not more 
important than participating in, for example, workshops, when measured in absolute terms. 
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 Table 1: T-Test for differences in mean values for different knowledge transfer 
mechanisms and stickiness 
 
Transfer factor Mean 
 high or medium trust group 
Mean 
 low or non-trust group 
T-value 
Workshops 5,27 
(1,03) 
4,96 
(2,13) 
0,92 
Project groups 4,93 
(3,21) 
4,04 
(5,22) 
1,57* 
Job-rotation 3,46 
(2,25) 
2,71 
(2,48) 
1,98** 
Stickiness 2,83 
(1,51) 
3,61 
(2,61) 
2,07** 
 
Based on a t-test assuming equal variances 
σ2-values are set in parentheses 
1=no importance, 4=moderate importance, 7= high importance 
*= 10% significance level, ** = 5% significance level, *** =1% significance level  
 
Transfers of knowledge are in the case of foreign acquired units by Danish firms mostly 
based on weak and medium tie-building mechanism. The participation in corporate 
workshops is apparently a common phenomenon, which is indicated by the high mean and 
the low variance. In some of the cases participating in project groups is of high importance 
but the high variance indicates the opposite behaviour as well. 
 
Job rotation is in focus here because it theoretically was characterized as a mechanism that 
ensures the transfer of tacit and critical knowledge. Trust was assumed to be an important 
element because the transfer of critical knowledge makes the dispatcher vulnerable to the 
receiver. However, only four firms responded with a  “6 or a 7” to the use of that transfer 
mechanism. In three of the cases the responders simultaneously reported a “6 or a 7” in the 
level of trust. In the last case the question concerning trust was not answered. In the first 
case the Danish corporation was medium sized with 400 employees. The relation between 
the acquirer and the target had been taking place for several years, but was based on a 
yearly contact. In the second case the Danish firm consisted of 3.500 employees, the 
relations had been taking place for 5 years but also on a yearly basis. The third respondent, 
a firm with 2.000 employees, did not answer the question of prior relationship. In the two 
first cases the relation between the acquirer and the target was on a competitive basis. In 
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the last case a former supplier through one year was acquired. However, the relation was 
on a weakly connection, which indicates a high degree of frequency. This acquirer was 
medium sized with 400 employees.  
 
The most significant impact that prior trust-based relations have on the subsequent 
knowledge transfers is the very low degree of stickiness it causes. In the group of 
acquisitions based on substantial elements of trust stickiness only occurs to some degree, 
often quite low. In contrast, without trust-based prior relations the acquisition partners face 
a medium and, in a few cases, a high degree of stickiness. The difference between the 
groups is significant at a 5 % level.  
 
An acquisition can here be interpreted as a stage in an ongoing learning process in how 
independent units communicate. Firms start communication by forming network relations. 
However, communication can take place at several levels and the relation may remain 
simple and dyadic, where only goods and services are transferred. Trust is not built up to 
the same degree as in the case of strategic alliances where critical knowledge is transferred 
across boundaries to make, for example, product development possible in both 
organisations. By starting exchanges of critical knowledge, stickiness will always occur in 
the beginning and is likely to decrease over time. The firms learn to handle the technical 
problems, and are willing to absorb and implement the knowledge. On the other hand, 
going from a market-based relationship to a hierarchical one may create political problems, 
whereby information is blocked in the struggle for organisational power. However, this 
does not seem to be the case here where the low variances indicate that a low degree of 
stickiness in the trust-based group is a general phenomenon.  
 
The mean in the group of either low trust relations or no relations at all shows that 
stickiness sometimes occurs after the take-over. Despite the fact that approximately four 
years have passed since the take-over, the group of prior relationships can often add 5 to 15 
years of prior experience in how to communicate. The effect of these relationships is 
substantial.  
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Further, the figures indicate that it is possible to transfer the experience gained through a 
market-based relation to a hierarchical solution. First of all the firms use their experience 
to communicate when they transfer knowledge hierarchically. In addition, they are to a 
higher degree able to build up strong communication ties ensuring a more effective flow of 
critical and tacit knowledge subsequent to the take-over. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks and Perspectives  
Communication is not easy and organisations have to start up the learning process so that 
transfers of knowledge may become efficient. In a network-based relationship, the two 
firms adapt their organisations thereby improving the absorption and communication 
techniques. In this connection the build up of trust is an important element. A high degree 
of trust indicates that both firms are willing to ignore opportunistic behaviour and instead 
transfer knowledge that consists of critical elements. Trust is then the foundation for using 
certain mechanisms that make transfers of complex and tacit knowledge possible. 
 
Sometimes a market-based relationship is transformed into a hierarchical relationship. The 
question is whether the firms are able to exploit the experience of prior knowledge 
exchanges. Apparently they are able to do so. A study of 54 Danish acquisitions abroad 
taking place in the period from 1994 to 1998 showed a significantly lower degree of 
stickiness in knowledge transfers subsequent to the take-over when substantial levels of 
trust were gained before the acquisition.  Further, the uses of strong tie-binding 
mechanisms were more likely to occur in those acquisitions based on prior trust-based 
relations. However, jobrotation is rarely used generally, and weak and medium tie-binding 
mechanism is more commonly used without any relation to the existence and degree of 
trust. 
 
The conclusion of this paper and the investigation of the relation between trust, knowledge 
transfers and stickiness is that prior trust-based relations minimised stickiness subsequent 
to the acquisition and simultaneously the firms are able to build strong communication ties 
between them by using transfer mechanisms such as jobrotation. The significant results 
also indicate that firms are able to transform market-based communication experience into 
a hierarchical concept.  
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However, the analysis and the results it derives also raise new questions to be investigated. 
Why is jobrotation so rarely used? If it is possible to transfer complex knowledge through 
this transfer mechanism, the capabilities and competences of the acquired firm could be 
transferred and exploited by other units in the corporation. On the other hand, the cost of 
expatriates is very high and the acquired firm may suffer from sending out their best 
employees to other corporate units.  
 
The analysis also derives a paradoxical theme. Apparently the network relations are well 
functioning since high degree of trust is gained and the subsequent transfers work 
smoothly. The question is why change a relationship that is efficient into a new setting that 
might not work. Normally, network theories postulate stableness in relationships, 
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1988; Hallén, Johanson & Seyed Mohammed, 1991; Forsgren et al 
1995), but revolutionising changes in the environment (Gort, 1969) or between the partners 
(Granovetter, 1985; Halinen, Salmi & Havila, 1999) might change circumstances in favour 
of an acquisition. Further, the acquiring firm might want full access to the competences of 
the target firm that in a market or a market hybrid situation still protect those competences 
from being imitated.  
 
Prior relations have an impact on the integration of acquired units. Instead of two pure 
independent and autonomous organisations, each of them heterogeneous in their structure 
(Penrose, 1959) and stamped by their historical development (Barney, 1986) the 
integration or merger instead takes place between two adapted and modified organisations. 
Acquisition implies the take-over of another firm, and therefore it is necessary to take 
every aspect of firm into consideration. Only one aspect is covered here, and much work 
still remains to be done on investigating the impact of prior relations between the acquirer 
and the target. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to point out the fact that 
prior relationships between the actors matter, and knowledge transfers become less sticky 
subsequent to the acquisition. One can therefore put forth a new proposition that other 
areas of strategy may be less sticky as well, if they are based on prior gained experience. 
On the other hand, it is not a natural law that every market-based experience is 
transformable into a hierarchical setting! To give one example, although transfers become 
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less sticky in general, this reduction in stickiness is not an incentive to build up strong ties 
among the merged organisations.  
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